附录

The Structural Agency Theory of Consciousness (English Version)

Abstract

This paper establishes the Structural Agency Theory of Consciousness (SATC) as a foundational paradigm for understanding consciousness as a graded, biologically grounded phenomenon emerging from the evolution of living structures. We argue that consciousness is not defined by subjective experience, symbolic representation, or information processing per se, but by biological agency (enactive capacity)—the intrinsic, structure-dependent ability of a living system to actively engage with, adapt to, and modify its environment in the service of its own persistence. Agency is treated as a functional property encoded by biological structure and expressed along a continuous evolutionary spectrum.

Grounded in evolutionary biology, neurodevelopment, and materialist philosophy, this framework replaces anthropocentric and dualistic accounts with a strictly biological causal chain: material → structure → function (agency). We propose a graded structural model of agency, spanning sessile life forms (e.g., plants), motile animals with centralized nervous systems, and humans as a special case of abstract–projective agency, characterized by the externalization of action through tools and symbolic systems. Consciousness, in this paradigm, is coextensive with biological agency but differentiates in complexity according to structural organization, particularly neural complexity.

This foundational paper defines the ontological commitments, core concepts, evolutionary origins, and methodological boundaries of the Structural Agency Theory, establishing a coherent theoretical basis for future work in neuroscience, biology, philosophy of mind, and embodied artificial intelligence.

Keywords: Consciousness, Agency, Enactive Capacity, Evolutionary Biology, Neurodevelopment, Structuralism, Embodied Cognition

1. Introduction

The scientific study of consciousness remains fragmented between phenomenological description, information-theoretic abstraction, and cognitive-functional modeling. While these approaches have yielded valuable descriptive insights, they often fail to anchor consciousness in biological first principles. In particular, many contemporary theories implicitly treat consciousness as a special property emerging only at advanced cognitive levels, frequently restricted to humans or human-like systems.

This paper advances a different starting point. We argue that consciousness must be understood as a biological phenomenon continuous with life itself, emerging through evolutionary increases in structural complexity rather than appearing as a categorical anomaly. To achieve this, we introduce the Structural Agency Theory of Consciousness, a framework that defines consciousness as a functional expression of biological agency rather than as subjective experience or abstract information processing.

Our aim is not to deny phenomenology, cognition, or information processing, but to reorder explanatory priority: phenomenological experience is treated as a descriptive layer, while agency—rooted in biological structure—is identified as the causal foundation of consciousness.

2. Ontological Commitments and Methodological Scope

2.1 Ontological Commitments

Material Causality: Only physical structures possess causal efficacy.
Structural Functionalism: Biological functions are intrinsic to material structure and are not externally assigned.
Agency as Biological Function: Agency is a biological function, not a representational or symbolic construct.
Non-Dualism: Consciousness has no independent causal status outside biological agency.

These commitments place the theory firmly within a radically materialist and evolutionary framework, while avoiding reduction to computational or informational abstractions.

2.2 Methodological Boundary

This framework explicitly rejects explanations of consciousness that rely on:

Non-structural or non-material causal entities
Purely informational or symbolic sufficiency claims
Dualistic separations between mind and biological substrate

Psychological, social, and environmental factors are recognized as modulators of biological structure and development, but not as independent causal sources detached from physical organization.

3. Core Definitions

3.1 Structure

Structure refers to a materially instantiated, evolutionarily stabilized organization capable of sustaining metabolic order and coordinated interaction with an environment.

3.2 Biological Agency (Enactive Capacity)

Biological agency is defined as the structure-dependent capacity of a living system to initiate, regulate, and sustain interactions with its environment in the service of its own persistence.

In this framework, agency corresponds to what is often described as enactive capacity or intrinsic activity, and does not imply deliberation, symbolic reasoning, moral responsibility, or free will.

3.3 Consciousness

Consciousness is the organism-level expression of biological agency enabled by living structure in continuous interaction with the environment.

Consciousness is thus coextensive with agency but differentiates in complexity according to structural organization. Phenomenological experience, where present, is treated as an emergent descriptive aspect rather than a causal substrate.

4. The Biological Origin of Agency

4.1 Metabolic Order and the Emergence of Agency

The origin of consciousness is inseparable from the origin of life. The earliest form of agency emerges with self-sustaining metabolic structures capable of maintaining local low-entropy states under global thermodynamic constraints.

At this level, agency is expressed as the intrinsic tendency of a structure to preserve its organization through regulated exchange with the environment. This constitutes the most minimal form of consciousness in the present framework.

4.2 Genetic Encoding and Structural Constraint

Biological agency is constrained and stabilized through genetic encoding and molecular organization. Damage to genetic or protein structure directly impairs agency by disrupting the structural basis of metabolic regulation.

This level establishes the evolutionary continuity of consciousness: later, more complex forms of agency do not replace this foundation but elaborate upon it.

5. Evolutionary Differentiation of Agency: A Structural Continuum

Biological agency is not binary but expressed along a continuum determined by structural complexity. We identify four major evolutionary stages, defined by structural transitions rather than anthropocentric criteria.

5.1 Level 0: Pre-Agentive Life

This level includes minimally organized life forms in which metabolic maintenance occurs without organism-level behavioral integration. Agency, if present, remains local rather than globally coordinated.

5.2 Level I: Distributed Sessile Agency

Plants exemplify distributed biological agency. They are sessile life forms whose organism-level location remains largely fixed throughout their life cycle. Nevertheless, they exhibit clear agency through environmental sensing, adaptive growth, resource optimization, and long-term environmental modification.

Plant agency is non-locomotive and growth-mediated, operating over extended temporal scales rather than rapid movement.

5.3 Level II: Centralized Sensorimotor Agency

With the evolution of centralized nervous systems, agency undergoes a qualitative shift. Animals at this level possess:

Perception–action loops
Locomotive capacity
Learning and behavioral flexibility

Agency here is centralized, rapid, and spatially mobile, enabling active exploration and short-term goal-directed behavior.

5.4 Level III: Abstract–Projective Agency

Humans represent a further structural transition characterized by the expansion of neural architecture—particularly the prefrontal cortex—supporting abstraction, long-term planning, and counterfactual modeling.

A defining feature of this level is the externalization of agency through tools and symbolic systems. Following a materialist reinterpretation of Marx's insight, tool creation and use are treated not as the origin of consciousness but as structural evidence of abstract, projective agency extending beyond immediate sensorimotor coupling.

6. Neurodevelopment and the Expression of Agency

The development of consciousness within an individual organism is the progressive unfolding of structurally encoded agency. Neurodevelopmental processes—including neurogenesis, synaptogenesis, and circuit specialization—provide the material basis for increasingly complex agency.

Environmental factors act as exciters and modulators, shaping the expression of pre-encoded structure without constituting independent causal origins of consciousness.

7. Impairment, Pathology, and Causal Explanation

Disorders of consciousness and agency must be understood as consequences of structural disruption. Genetic anomalies, developmental failures, injury, and neurodegeneration impair agency by damaging its biological substrate.

Psychological and social factors influence consciousness only insofar as they affect neural development and structural integrity. This framework therefore excludes explanations that detach mental phenomena from material causation, while retaining the relevance of environmental modulation.

8. Implications for Artificial and Synthetic Agency

The Structural Agency Theory has direct implications for artificial intelligence. If consciousness is grounded in biological agency, then artificial systems pursuing human-level intelligence must move beyond disembodied software architectures.

Future artificial general intelligence would require embodied, structurally complex, multi-material systems capable of sustaining persistent interaction loops with their environments, approximating the structural conditions of Level III agency.

9. Conclusion

The Structural Agency Theory of Consciousness reframes consciousness as a graded biological phenomenon rooted in the evolution of living structure. By identifying agency as the causal core of consciousness, this paradigm restores continuity between life, behavior, and cognition, while rejecting anthropocentric and dualistic assumptions.

Human consciousness is not a metaphysical exception but a highly elaborated form of biological agency. This foundational framework establishes a coherent basis for future empirical, theoretical, and applied research across biology, neuroscience, philosophy, and artificial intelligence.